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Exchange on the Nixon Administration and the
Vietnam War
To the Editor:
I am grateful for the generally favorable review given my book The Vietnam
War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy (Lawrence: Uni-
versity Press of Kansas, 2004) in the Winter 2007 issue of the Journal of Cold
War Studies. Unfortunately, the reviewer, James J. Wirtz, grossly misrepre-
sented the nature of the book and my theses, while also failing to place these
theses in historiographic context.
Wirtz asserts, for example, that “Kimball seems most interested in using
the documentary evidence to demonstrate that [President Richard] Nixon
was in fact ‘mad’ in seeking to create the impression that he was becoming in-
creasingly irrational.” To the contrary, I do not claim that either Nixon or
Henry Kissinger was necessarily mad or certiªably crazy in pursuing “mad-
man theory” stratagems. I do demonstrate, however, that they were naive and
unsuccessful in using this stratagem.
The reviewer implies that I claim that Nixon and Kissinger “realized that
Chinese and Soviet ofªcials were willing to ªght in Vietnam to the last North
Vietnamese soldier.” Nixon and Kissinger thought no such thing. Indeed,
their “triangular” and “linkage” diplomacy was based on quite different as-
sumptions.
Wirtz claims that “Nixon and Kissinger were masterful practitioners of
realpolitik” and that “Kissinger also emerges as a consummate diplomat,”
thus implying that I drew these conclusions or that the documentary evidence
I present in the book supported them. Instead, I argue that all parties—in-
cluding Vietnamese, Soviet, and Chinese—engaged in realpolitik, but that of
all the players Nixon and Kissinger were the least successful. Concerning
Kissinger’s diplomatic skills, he was tactically very clever and a good debater,
but he was also, as Nixon himself often commented, a poor negotiator.
Wirtz refers to the documentary excerpts in the book as “fragments.” In
fact, most of the documents are substantial excerpts, and some are whole
documents—all properly referenced to the originals. The book, as I explain in
the preface, is not intended to be a comprehensive compendium or, in the re-
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viewer’s words, a “sustained narrative.” It is intended to provide substantial
examples accompanied by ample analyses of recently declassiªed documen-
tary evidence bearing on key historiographic issues concerning Nixon’s and
Kissinger’s direction of the Vietnam War. For a “sustained narrative,” Wirtz
should have consulted my earlier book, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 1998).
Wirtz also omitted mention of other key issues and topics I document
and analyze in The Vietnam War Files; for example, the progress of the secret
negotiations, the so-called Nixon Doctrine, the decent-interval exit strategy,
and the false and mythical narrative Nixon and Kissinger concocted after the
war to defend their failed policies.
I fail to see how historical research can advance if reviewers do not accu-




Reply from James J. Wirtz
Jeffrey Kimball’s fundamental complaint about my review is that it offered an
inaccurate depiction of his book. This is surprising because the way he charac-
terizes his manuscript generally corresponds to my description of The Viet-
nam War Files. In my review, I wrote that the book contained “excerpts of se-
lected documents” and “fragments of documents,” whereas Kimball says the
book contains “substantial excerpts” of documents. I also informed readers
that the book lacked a sustained narrative. Kimball concurs and suggests I
consult another of his works if I seek this type of monograph. Kimball states
an important purpose behind his volume was to demonstrate that Richard
Nixon and Henry Kissinger were “naïve and unsuccessful” in using the “mad
man” strategy to extract the United States from Vietnam, whereas I stated that
his analysis provided a “less than glowing depiction of the Nixon administra-
tion’s efforts to extract the United States from its disastrous military involve-
ment in Southeast Asia.” A careful reader of Kimball’s letter can see that his
critique actually conªrms the accuracy of my review, or at least that I did not
“grossly misrepresent the nature of his work.”
Nevertheless, I do understand why Kimball might be less than pleased by
my review. Much like the preceding paragraph, I used the documentary evi-
dence he provided in his book to develop an explanation and assessment of
the Nixon administration’s efforts to end the Vietnam War that was diametri-
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cally opposed to his analysis. In other words, after summarizing Kimball’s
gloomy view of the Nixon White House, I offered a brief commentary on
why I believed that the documentary evidence justiªed a more positive view
of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s efforts to extract the United States from the Viet-
nam War. By using triangular diplomacy to detach North Vietnam from its
patrons in Moscow and Beijing, Nixon and Kissinger succeeded in altering
the military balance in Southeast Asia, forcing Hanoi to the negotiating table.
Nixon and Kissinger made the most of what in hindsight still appears to be
the incredibly weak diplomatic and military hand dealt to it by previous ad-
ministrations. Kimball states that my positive assessment of Nixon and
Kissinger’s diplomacy is wrong, not in agreement with his view of events, and
is not derived from the proper “historiographic context,” which seems to im-
ply that the review is outside mainstream scholarship. In a short letter it is im-
possible to explore the merits of my argument or the origins of my allegedly
inappropriate ideas. However, in my view the documents provided by The
Vietnam War Files offer ample evidence for my interpretation of the Nixon
administration’s effort to end the war in Southeast Asia.
“Historical research” will “advance” because of scholarly disagreement
over the interpretation of facts, not by the effort to preserve proper historiog-
raphy.
—James J. Wirtz,
Dean of International Graduate Studies,
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School
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